We study how an acquirer's public visibility affects antitrust enforcement in mergers and its real economic consequences. Using a novel dataset linking FTC and DOJ inspection outcomes to news coverage of merger parties, we find that a 10 percent increase in the acquirer's share of industry news coverage raises the likelihood of being flagged by 1.5 to 3 percent. We establish causality using geographical proximity to media outlets as an exogenous source of variation in news coverage. We interpret these results through a political‐accountability framework: higher visibility raises the reputational stakes of enforcement, leading regulators to challenge more visible acquirers. Consistent with this accountability framework, the visibility gradient strengthens during congressional appropriations hearings and disappears in lame-duck periods. It is also substantially stronger in consumer-facing industries, where accountability pressures are highest. Finally, visibility-driven scrutiny has real effects: overlooked low-visibility deals gain market power, while flagged acquirers expand inefficiently and face a higher financial burden. Our results highlight how public salience distorts merger review and generates persistent post-merger inefficiencies.

We show that investors misreact to technological innovations based on their novelty, and that these misreactions distort firms’ subsequent innovation directions. First, using textual measures of novelty, we find that investors underreact to the issuance of novel innovations but overreact to non-novel ones. Novel patent issuance predicts lower risk and positive forecast errors, consistent with non-risk-based mispricing. A model where boundedly-rational investors are uncertain about the true novelty of a patent at issuance explains the empirical patterns well. Second, using sensational news as an exogenous shock to misreaction, we present causal evidence that, after disappointing returns to patent news, novel firms follow up less on current novel technologies, and shift future innovations from novelty-seeking to copycatting when exploring new areas. The findings highlight that investors' misreactions to patent novelty steer innovation away from higher-valued, groundbreaking research.

China has experienced explosive patenting growth across technologies deemed critical by the U.S. Department of Defense. The U.S. has sought to limit knowledge transfers to China, both through corporate relationships and individual mobility. We explore knowledge flows embodied in individuals by linking domestic Chinese patents to inventors’ social media profiles. Substantial inventor flows occurred in the 2010s between technologically similar large U.S. and Chinese firms, especially those originally venture-backed, but diminished sharply later in the decade. The share of breakthrough Chinese patents associated with these inventors is modest and evidence of indirect spillovers is very limited. We address concerns about Chinese patents as economic indicators, patent secrecy, and social media censoring.

What drives state regulation of nonbanks? We examine the factors influencing state-level regulation of nonbank financial institutions. As nonbanks—particularly fintech lenders—capture a growing share of the consumer credit market, states have responded with diverse regulatory approaches. To analyze these responses, we construct one of the first comprehensive databases of enforcement actions against nonbanks across 47 states over 20 years. Leveraging this dataset, we find limited evidence that state regulations are primarily motivated by consumer protection or aiding subprime borrowers. Instead, we find evidence suggesting that state regulators may target nonbanks to “protect” state-chartered banks from competition. To explore this further, we investigate the “demand” side, where state-chartered banks lobby to reduce competitive pressure, and the “supply” side, where state regulators respond due to incentives like job prospects or financial repression. Regulators may also aim to maintain financial stability, concerned that excessive competition could lead state-chartered banks to take on riskier behaviors.